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Abstract 
This paper analyzes some determinant conditions under which neighborhood formation gives 
rise to segregation by income. In contrast to the literature, we explore the sequential arrival of 
poor and rich individuals to neighborhoods exploited by oligopolistic land developers. These 
developers try to maximize a discounted flow of lot prices during neighborhood formation, 
taking advantage of the local externalities generated by the rich and the poor. Under a speedy 
arrival of new potential inhabitants and/or low discount rates, competing developers are more 
likely to concentrate rich people in the same neighborhood. This happens because the benefits 
from early agglomeration are outweighed by a more profitable matching of rich neighbors 
within nearby lots. 
 
1. Introduction 
The choice of neighborhood is one of the most determinant decisions in the social and 
economic life of any individual. That is especially significant when segregation (by race, 
income, etc) has long-lasting effects in the dynastic trajectories of those favored and 
disfavored by the environment they live in. In this paper we propose a framework in 
which, from a purely positive – as opposed to normative – point of view, we can analyze 
the dynamic conditions in which new integrated and segregated neighborhoods arise. 
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As it is well-known, the endogenous processes of socioeconomic sorting or scrambling 
have been already extensively studied by the profession. Early pioneers, like Schelling, 
were able to vividly describe the conditions for integrated equilibria to become 
unstable. The main difference between Schelling (1978)’s study and Becker and Murphy 
(2000)’s is that the former analyzes a process by which the members of two (or more) 
groups want to congregate with other members of their own kind; whereas in the latter 
case there is a unique desirable type (‘the high’, or ‘the rich’), and everybody wants to 
be close to them. In principle, we may think that segregated equilibria are more 
plausible in Schelling’s environment; though De Bartolome (1990) and Benabou (1993) 
show that – under reasonable conditions – segregation is also excessive from a 
normative viewpoint in the second case. 
In our model, as in the cases of Schelling (1978) or Becker and Murphy (2000), 
externalities within neighborhoods are the driving force of individuals’ welfare and 
willingness to pay. For instance, anybody would like to live close to well reputed judges 
or doctors who could help you in case of need. Therefore, people will tend to receive 
higher positive externalities from high (‘rich’) rather than low (‘poor’) types.3 In their 
model (like in ours) people derive utility both from local externalities and from housing 
facilities (amenities)4. 
However, their starting point is a fully integrated neighborhood where everybody has a 
residence from the beginning. In that context, they analyze the conditions under which 
the initially integrated configuration evolves towards a different one (either partially or 
fully segregated). On the contrary, in our model we portray new neighborhoods that are 
filled step by step with the sequential arrival of poor and rich residents. Also unlike 
Becker and Murphy (2000), which includes a single developer and competitive bidding 
by households (those with the highest willingness to pay always obtain the desired 
residence); we consider a situation of duopolistic competition between developers. That 
competition (together with the fact that people arrive sequentially and henceforth 
cannot directly compete with each other) prevents the extraction of the whole 
willingness to pay from buyers. 
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The main features of our model are its dynamic nature (because of the sequential 
arrivals) and the strategic interaction between developers. What does the dynamic 
nature of our model add? It adds the possibility of understanding how residents’ higher 
(or lower) arrival rates determine the final degree of neighborhood segregation. Why? 
Because, in this case, even though the rich had a uniformly higher (marginal) willingness 
to pay to live with other rich people, this would not guarantee segregation. Since there 
are agglomeration gains from accepting immediately the poor who come, under a very 
slow arrival rate it may be in the developers’ interest to offer them a cheap lot. 
Therefore, we can observe the implications of lower interest rates (when waiting for the 
rich is not costly) and higher/lower arrival rates of the rich (dependent on income 
distribution, demographics, migration...) for the degree of segregation.5 
In this sense, in order to provide some motivation for that result, we want to emphasize 
the faster urbanization in most areas of the New World (America) relative to the Old 
Continent (see e.g. Puga (1998)), and the potential connections between this fact and 
the higher levels of segregation we can observe today in many New World’s cities. 
On the other hand, the strategic (oligopolistic) interaction between developers is useful 
to introduce another crucial implication of this framework: vacant lots may appear in 
certain periods, since interactions drive developers to wait, in order to relax competition 
and make larger profits in later stages. In reality, these vacant lots are easily observed in 
many neighborhoods. If carefully developed, this idea may have strong policy 
implications: certain forms of competition among developers may slow down the 
process of lot filling, leading to possible dynamic losses in the housing markets. 
There are abundant samples in the recent literature analyzing the interaction between 
inequality and segregation. The main piece of evidence that they were trying to explain 
is the coexistence of a declining trend for US racial inequality in the United States, and 
the continuity of extreme levels of urban racial separation. Both Sethi and Somanathan 
(2004) and Bayer, Fang and McMillan (2005) took inequality levels as a primitive for 
their models6, as we do. However, the former authors obtained non-monotonic 
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segregation levels as a response to growing inter-racial disparities, by introducing an 
individual concern for the racial composition of the community. In turn, Bayer, Fang and 
McMillan incorporated an endogeneity in the number of communities, created by 
homogeneous segments of the household population (as in Durlauf (1996)) to explain 
how richer middle-income blacks had a new incentive to separate from their low-
income counterparts, which aggravated segregation.  
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the connection between 
developer competition, inequality (as a determinant of arrival rates) and urban 
segregation. Nevertheless, our project is still in such a preliminary stage that we do not 
know yet whether we will be able to replicate the stylized facts with this original 
approach. 
Finally, some recent and very interesting papers are providing new insights on the 
simultaneous (joint) determination of inequality and segregation, by means of 
asymmetric information considerations among members of different racial groups (see 
e.g. Lundberg and Startz (2007)). Although we aim to generate segregation in the 
absence of asymmetric information, these papers are especially relevant to us, since 
they use search models as a tool to model interactions in which the sequence of arrivals 
is stochastic, and not strictly predetermined. This sort of technique seems to be crucial 
to extend our research in the future. 
2. The Model: Main Assumptions and Basic Structure 
In order to derive our main insights with a model as simple as possible, we are going to 
consider two given neighborhoods (developments), each of which will be run by a 
developer (duopolist). For simplicity, every neighborhood will just consist of two lots. 
Moreover, a predetermined and certain sequence of four people (two of them will be 
rich, two of them poor) will arrive to these neighborhoods in four different time periods. 
Residents will derive utility both from within-neighborhood externalities and from 
residential facilities, and (again, for simplicity) will be attached to the same lot from 
their arrival ad infinitum. Since our main purpose is eliciting the determinants of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
feature of this preliminary work. We would like to relax it, by means of the introduction of a stochastic process of 
arrival to the different neighborhoods. At the present moment, our main doubt is whether we should also 
dispense with the strategic interaction among developers (by introducing a continuum of them in a standard 
search model) or we should preserve such oligopolistic structure, with the interesting implications underlined in 
the main body of the text. 
5 
 
segregation in terms of both within-group and between-group externalities, we will 
consider that per-period residential utility (u) will be identical for rich and poor 
individuals. On the contrary, the magnitude of the momentary externalities will differ 
according to their origin and destination. That is, we will differentiate between the 
externality generated by a rich to another rich (xhh), by a rich to a poor (xhl), by a poor to 
a rich (xlh) and by a poor to another poor (xll). The terms rich and poor will be henceforth 
equivalent to high (h) and low (l).  
We spell out right now our condition on the rankings of xhh, xhl, xlh and xll, by introducing 
our first assumption, which broadly conforms to Luttmer (2005)7’s empirical results: 
𝑥ℎℎ > 𝑥ℎ𝑙 > 𝑥𝑙 ≡ 𝑥𝑙ℎ = 𝑥𝑙𝑙      (1) 
Since individuals (or dynasties) will remain in their lot for an infinite number of periods 
after arrival, the total willingness to pay exhibited by any resident will be represented by 
the (discounted) cumulative externality (cx) enjoyed since his arrival to the 
neighborhood till the end of his infinite life. Time is going to be discrete, and our 
measure of the arrival rate is going to be the discount factor between two periods (
1
1+𝑟
). 
That is, the smaller is r, the shorter will be the time period between two arrivals. 
Therefore, a decline in the interest rate of the economy will be equivalent to a faster 
arrival rate of new neighbors for our analysis of segregation. Furthermore, we assume 
that our duopolists cannot differentiate the product to target any specific population 
group. However, they are allowed to price-discriminate over time to extract as much of 
the residents’ cumulative externality as possible. Both developers have full information 
and know the certain sequencing of arrivals. 
Finally, let us emphasize that our analysis is going to be purely positive instead of 
normative. This means that we will not try to determine the optimal allocation of 
residents for a given arrival rate, but just the predictable pattern of segregation – or 
integration - according to the parameter values, which are r, x’s and u. 
3. Integrated and segregated equilibria 
Since neighborhoods just have two lots, the only possible configurations are fully 
integrated (with a high-type and a low-type in each neighborhood) or fully segregated 
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(with two highs with one of the developers and two lows with the other). Buyers will 
arrive sequentially to the neighborhoods, where both duopolists will compete for them: 
the sequence begins with a high-type in period 1 (h1), and continues with a low type in 
period 2 (l2), with both types alternating subsequently. The developer who attracts h1 in 
period 1 will be called “rich developer” (RD), whereas the other duopolist will be called 
“poor developer” (PD). 
It is immediately obvious that, in period 1, the newcomer high-type (h1) is indifferent as 
to which neighborhood to choose. This is true because neither of the developers has any 
initial advantage over the other (yet) to attract h1, and therefore both of them will 
quote the same price and offer h1 identical utility. However, from period 2 onwards, the 
neighborhood owned by RD will be more attractive to new residents in terms of future 
externalities. This fact will allow RD to (be able to) capture those residents he is really 
interested in; to the extent that the nature of the configuration (either segregated or 
integrated) will only depend on RD’s willingness to attract l2 or not. That is, our 
configuration will be integrated (segregated) if and only if RD accepts (rejects) l2 in his 
neighborhood. 
The extensive form of the game that determines the nature of the equilibrium can be 
found in the appendix (see the decision tree). In principle, we can guess that RD will 
decide to take l2 (and generate an integrated configuration) if the level of residential 
utility (u) and/or the discount rate (r) are high enough, since in that case he would need 
to wait a long time for h3 and would also miss a high potential price on the resident l2. 
However, we need to be more systematic and solve the game backwards, starting by the 
last arrival (l4), in order to find out the different parameter values that give rise to 
integrated/segregated equilibria. 
To that purpose, we will move a few nodes down the decision tree, by assuming first 
that the configuration is segregated (i.e. RD decides to reject l2) and PD chooses not to 
wait and takes immediately l2. Under those conditions, we can establish the preliminary 
result specified in Lemma 1. But before stating such a lemma, let us before anticipate 
that the duopolists’ strategies are characterized by ‘limit pricing’ (i.e. the competitor 
with a lowest minimum price will (roughly) be able to attract the buyer, and will charge 
him a price equal to the minimum price of his rival, minus an epsilon). Moreover, such 
strategies are subject to a participation constraint, by which no resident will pay a price 
superior to the future cumulative externality he will enjoy living in the lot. 
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3.1. Segregated configuration; PD decides not to wait 
Lemma 1: Under the assumptions specified in (1) and in any segregated configuration, 
RD will be able to attract h3 (for all positive values of u and r), provided that PD decided 
to accept l2 in period 2. 
Proof: In order to prove it, let us start solving the game by the last arrival (l4). When 
either PD or RD receive l4, there will be no competition between them, since there will 
be just one empty lot in one of the neighborhoods. Therefore, both developers would 
charge a monopoly price over l4. That is, they will be able to extract the whole 
cumulative externality plus the residential utility enjoyed by this buyer (l4). More 
formally, 
𝑝𝑙4
𝑃𝐷 𝑙, 𝑙 ℎ, ℎ = 𝑐𝑥𝑙4
𝑃𝐷 𝑙, 𝑙 ℎ, ℎ ;  𝑝𝑙4
𝑹𝑫 𝑙, ℎ ℎ, 𝑙 = 𝑐𝑥𝑙4
𝑹𝑫 𝑙,ℎ ℎ, 𝑙    (2) 
In expression (2) above, 𝑝𝑙4
𝑃𝐷 𝑙, 𝑙 ℎ,ℎ  denotes the price set by PD to resident l4 when we 
have segregation, i.e. when the neighborhood administered by RD concentrates both 
high types and PD hosts the low types:  𝑙, 𝑙 ℎ, ℎ . Similarly, 𝑐𝑥𝑙4
𝑃𝐷 𝑙, 𝑙 ℎ,ℎ  stands for the 
cumulative externality enjoyed by l4 in PD’s neighborhood under the same 
circumstances, including the residential utility available in every period after arrival. 
However, we still do not know which of the two developers will finally receive l4. 
Therefore, in order to be sure about the issue, we need to find out the prices they will 
set on h3: if RD attracts h3, l4 will go for sure to the only empty lot in PD’s neighborhood. 
The minimum price that RD would set on h3 is one leaving him indifferent between 
attracting h3 or not. This price is: 
𝑝ℎ3(𝑙|ℎ)
𝑹𝑫𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑝𝑙4
𝑹𝑫 𝑙,ℎ ℎ, 𝑙 
 1 + 𝑟 
=
𝑐𝑥𝑙4
𝑹𝑫 𝑙, ℎ ℎ, 𝑙 
 1 + 𝑟 
   (3) 
Expression (3) implies that RD is indifferent between capturing h3 at a price 𝑝ℎ3(𝑙|ℎ)
𝑹𝑫𝑚𝑖𝑛  and 
waiting until period 4 to extract a monopoly price from buyer l4. On the other hand, the 
minimum price for PD will be: 
𝑝ℎ3(𝑙|ℎ)
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑐𝑥𝑙4
𝑃𝐷 𝑙, 𝑙 ℎ, ℎ 
(1 + 𝑟)
   (4) 
Who will attract h3 when both developers are competing for it? The winner of the 
competition will be the developer showing the lowest minimum price, once this price 
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has been adjusted for the difference in cumulative externalities enjoyed by h3 in each 
neighborhood. Subsequently, the winner of the competition for h3 will set an 
equilibrium-price equal to the minimum price of the other developer (possibly minus an 
epsilon). In this particular case, using (3) and (4) we can obtain that RD will attract h3 in 
scenario (l2-,h1 -) if and only if 
                              
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑹𝑫 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
 1+𝑟 
<
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷  𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
 1+𝑟 
+ (𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫  - 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 )   (5) 
The last term in brackets reflects the adjustment in terms of the difference in 
cumulative externalities for h3 between both neighborhoods. If we express condition (5) 
in terms of the underlying parameters, we can conclude that RD will capture h3 if and 
only if8 
                                                                1 + 𝑟 >
𝑥ℎ𝑙−𝑥𝑙
𝑥ℎℎ −𝑥𝑙
    (6) 
And it is easy to observe that this condition (6) immediately holds as a result of our 
assumption (1). That is, provided that we are in a segregated configuration and PD did 
not postpone the attraction of l2, RD will always be able (and willing) to capture h3. This 
completes the proof. 
It is noticeable that we have not considered the participation constraints of resident h3 
during the previous proof. The reason for that is the following: the prices finally quoted 
by both developers are inferior to the cumulative externalities that this buyer would 
enjoy in the respective neighborhoods. However, so far we only know their minimum 
prices. Which are the prices they would actually set on h3?  
The answer comes from Lemma 1: since RD is going to be the winner for sure, his 
unconstrained 9  optimal price will be 𝑝ℎ3 𝑙 ℎ 
𝑹𝑫 =
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷  𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
 1+𝑟 
+ (𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫  – 
𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 ) <  𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫 , since 
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷  𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
 1+𝑟 
= 
 𝑥𝑙+𝑢
𝑟
< 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 =
𝑥𝑙+𝑢
𝑟
 1 + 𝑟 . 
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9
 The term unconstrained means here that this is RD’s optimal price if we disregard the resident’s participation 
constraint. 
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By the same token, since PD will be for sure the loser in the competition, he will just 
quote his minimum price, i.e. 𝑝ℎ3 𝑙 ℎ 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝ℎ3 𝑙 ℎ 
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷  𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
 1+𝑟 
< 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 , as checked 
just three lines above.  
Our next questions are: which will be the final PD’s payoff from accepting immediately l2 
in period 2? And which are the conditions (in terms of the parameters) for RD to prefer 
segregation to integration? Both will be clarified in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: Our configuration will be segregated (by RD’s decision) if and only if 
 1 + 𝑟  𝑥ℎℎ − 𝑥ℎ𝑙 1 + 𝑟  − (𝑥ℎ𝑙 − 𝑥𝑙) > 𝑟𝑢 
Moreover, PD’s final payoff from accepting immediately l2 is equal to 
Min  
2𝑢
𝑟 1+𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1+𝑟 
+
𝑥ℎℎ
𝑟
−  
1+𝑟
𝑟
 𝑥ℎ𝑙   ,
2𝑢
𝑟 1+𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1+𝑟 
+
 2+𝑟 𝑢
(1+𝑟)
    (7) 
Proof: Let us first determine under which conditions RD will capture l2. If PD were the 
loser in the competition for this resident, he would be able to charge later pure 
monopoly prices to h3 and l4. In that case, PD’s profits from period 2 onwards would be 
𝜋2 − ℎ1 
𝑃𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟 =
𝑐𝑥ℎ3 ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷
 1 + 𝑟 
+
𝑐𝑥𝑙4 ℎ ,𝑙 ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷
 1 + 𝑟 2
    8  
Alternatively, we know from Lemma 1 that if PD were the winner in the competition, he 
would not be able to gain h3, and therefore his revenue from period 2 onwards would 
be 
                                       𝜋2 − ℎ1 
𝑃𝐷𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 𝑝𝑙2 𝑙2,𝑙4 ℎ1,ℎ3 
𝑃𝐷 +
𝑐𝑥𝑙4 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑃𝐷
 1 + 𝑟 2
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By equating (8) and (9), we are able to obtain the minimum price 𝑝𝑙2 𝑙2,𝑙4 ℎ1,ℎ3 
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛  as 
follows: 
𝑝𝑙2 𝑙2,𝑙4 ℎ1,ℎ3 
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑐𝑥ℎ3 ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷
 1 + 𝑟 
+
𝑐𝑥𝑙4 ℎ ,𝑙 ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷
 1 + 𝑟 2
−
𝑐𝑥𝑙4 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑃𝐷
 1 + 𝑟 2
    10  
On the other hand, if RD chose to reject l2 the subsequent configuration would be 
segregated, since he would be able to attract h3 with certainty. Furthermore, h3 would 
be charged a price given by (5), i.e. 
10 
 
                                       𝑝ℎ3(𝑙 ,ℎ)
𝑹𝑫 =
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷  𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
 1+𝑟 
+ (𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫  - 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 )    
Therefore, the minimum price RD would require to capture l2 would be 
                                     𝑝𝑙2 ℎ3,𝑙4 ℎ1,𝑙2 
𝑹𝑫𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷  𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
 1+𝑟 2
+
 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫  – 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷  
 1+𝑟 
   (11) 
If we compare (10) and (11), (expressing all equations in terms of the parameters) taking 
into account the necessary adjustment in terms of the different cumulative externalities 
enjoyed by l2, we come to the conclusion that RD will win the competition for l2 if and 
only if 
                                      1 + 𝑟  𝑥ℎℎ − 𝑥ℎ𝑙 1 + 𝑟  − (𝑥ℎ𝑙 − 𝑥𝑙) > 𝑟𝑢   (12) 
This completes the first part of the proof.  
Now we are going to look at the profitability for PD of accepting l2 without delay in case 
of segregation. Under such circumstances, PD’s revenue from period 2 onwards would 
be 
                                   𝑀𝑖𝑛  𝑝𝑙2 ℎ3,𝑙4 ℎ1,𝑙2 
𝑹𝑫𝑚𝑖𝑛 −  𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑹𝑫 − 𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑃𝐷 , 𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑃𝐷 +
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷
 1+𝑟 2
   (13) 
We can observe that expression (13) incorporates the participation constraint in the 
price charged to l2 by PD
10, since this resident can never be charged a price higher than 
his cumulative externality received in the lot (otherwise he would refuse to locate 
there). Now, using (11) and (13), we can restate the last expression as 
𝜋 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔
𝑛𝑜  𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛  
2𝑢
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
𝑥ℎℎ
𝑟
−  
1 + 𝑟
𝑟
 𝑥ℎ𝑙   ,
2𝑢
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
 2 + 𝑟 𝑢
(1 + 𝑟)
  
This finalizes the proof of Proposition 1. 
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 Rigorously speaking, the pricing strategies followed by RD and PD in period 2 can be specified as follows: 
𝑝𝑙2
𝑹𝑫(-|h1)=max[min(𝑝𝑙2
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 +  𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑹𝑫 − 𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑃𝐷 , 𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑹𝑫),  𝑝𝑙2 ℎ3,𝑙4 ℎ1,𝑙2 
𝑹𝑫𝑚𝑖𝑛 ] 
𝑝𝑙2
𝑃𝐷 (-|h1)=max[min(𝑝𝑙2
𝑹𝑫𝑚𝑖𝑛 −  𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑹𝑫 − 𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑃𝐷 , 𝑐𝑥𝑙2
𝑃𝐷 ),  𝑝𝑙2 ℎ3,𝑙4 ℎ1,𝑙2 
𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 ] 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 We also need to examine the situation in which PD postpones the attraction of l2 in 
case of segregation. He may do it in order to avoid the competition from RD and  to 
extract pure monopoly profits from both l2[3] and l4 (henceforth we will denote by l2[3] 
the poor resident who arrives in period 2 and has to wait until period 3 to be assigned a 
lot in PD’s neighborhood). The comparison of PD’s gains in both situations will allow us 
to elucidate for which parameter values it is in the interest of this developer to 
postpone or not. 
3.2. Segregated configuration; PD decides to postpone the attraction of l2[3] 
When PD decides to keep l2 out of his neighborhood until period 3, he will do it either 
because he is aiming to capture h3, or because he prefers charging both low types (l2[3] 
and l4) a monopoly price. We are going to rule out the first possibility by proving that 
PD’s payoff of postponing and getting h3 is lower than that of accepting l2 in period 2. 
Intuitively, in order to attract h3, PD would need to quote such a low price that this 
would not compensate him given the relatively weak inter-group externalities. We can 
summarize this statement as follows: 
Lemma 2: If PD decides to postpone (under our conditions in (1) and provided that 
0<r<1), it will never be in his interest to capture h3. Therefore, PD will only consider 
charging a pure monopoly price to l2[3] and l4. 
Proof: Suppose for the moment that PD is able to get h3 in period 3. Under this premise, 
we are going to get to a contradiction.  
PD’s payoff resulting from postponing and obtaining h3 will consequently be 𝑝ℎ3 𝑙 ℎ 
𝑃𝐷 =
𝑝ℎ3
𝑹𝑫𝑚𝑖𝑛 − (𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫  – 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 ).  Furthermore, subsequently PD would compete 
(under equality of conditions!) with RD for l2[3] and l4, and hence we can predict that 
both residents could be captured (by both duopolists) with a probability of ½. All in all, 
PD’s payoff from postponing and obtaining h3 (and either l2[3] or l4) would be: 
    
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑹𝑫 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
 1+𝑟 
− (𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫  – 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 ℎ ,𝑙 ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 ) +
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷  ℎ ,𝑙 ℎ ,𝑙 
 1+𝑟 
= 
   = 2
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑹𝑫 𝑙 ,ℎ ℎ ,𝑙 
 1+𝑟 
− (𝑐𝑥ℎ3 𝑙 ,𝑙 ℎ ,ℎ 
𝑹𝑫  – 𝑐𝑥ℎ3 ℎ ,𝑙 ℎ ,𝑙 
𝑃𝐷 )   (15) 
On the other hand, we know from Proposition 1 that PD’s payoff (in terms of the 
parameters) from accepting immediately l2 would be 
12 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛  
2𝑢
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
𝑥ℎℎ
𝑟
−  
1 + 𝑟
𝑟
 𝑥ℎ𝑙     ,
2𝑢
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
 2 + 𝑟 𝑢
(1 + 𝑟)
    16  
By expressing (15) in terms of the parameters and comparing the outcome with (16), we 
come to the conclusion that the payoff from accepting immediately l2 exceeds that from 
waiting for h3 (i.e. (16) is higher than (15)) if 
𝑥ℎℎ > 𝑥ℎ𝑙 ; 𝑥ℎℎ > 𝑥𝑙  𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 < 𝑟 < 1   17  
And (17) is guaranteed for sure, given (1), if we also impose as a reasonable condition 
that 0<r<1. This completes the proof. 
The next step will be finding out a sufficient condition under which PD will never 
postpone the acceptance of l2, in case of segregation. We will obtain here a remarkable 
result: for all parameter values that allow for segregation, PD could never decide to 
postpone. In other words, segregation excludes postponing. Why is this intuitive? 
Because segregation itself requires a low residential utility, since otherwise RD would 
never forego the immediate possible charges on l2 (relative to those on h3, which are 
discounted); but, precisely, a high residential utility is a prerequisite for postponing, 
since all that utility can be extracted from l2[3] with monopoly power. That is the reason 
why both phenomena are incompatible. All this is summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2:  A segregated configuration excludes postponing on the part of the PD. 
Proof: By expression (12), segregation implies that  
 1 + 𝑟  𝑥ℎℎ − 𝑥ℎ𝑙 1 + 𝑟  −  𝑥ℎ𝑙 − 𝑥𝑙 > 𝑟𝑢 . Therefore, since (by (1)) 𝑥ℎ𝑙 >
𝑥𝑙 , then segregation also implies that 
𝑟𝑢 <  1 + 𝑟  𝑥ℎℎ − 𝑥ℎ𝑙 1 + 𝑟      18  
Now, as (by Lemma 2) PD can never attain h3 by postponing, his payoff derived from 
that option will come as a result of the monopoly power exercised on l2[3] and l4. Those 
returns from postponing can be expressed as follows11: 
                                            
𝑐𝑥 𝑙2[3]
𝑃𝐷
(1+𝑟)
+
𝑐𝑥 𝑙4
𝑃𝐷
(1+𝑟)2
=
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟(1+𝑟)
+
 2+𝑟 𝑢
𝑟(1+𝑟)
   (19) 
                                                          
11
 That payoff is expressed in period-two monetary units. 
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We know from (16) which the returns are from accepting immediately l2. Notice that the 
term on the right of expression (16) is clearly bigger than (19). Therefore, the only 
chance we have that PD could postpone is that the term on the left of (16) is both 
smaller than the term on the right of (16) and smaller than expression (19). Is that 
possible? We will see that it is not.  
Suppose that expression (19) represents a bigger number than the term on the left of 
(16). Then, 
 2 + 𝑟 𝑢
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
>
2𝑢
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
2𝑥𝑙
𝑟 1 + 𝑟 
+
𝑥ℎℎ
𝑟
−  
1 + 𝑟
𝑟
 𝑥ℎ𝑙  
And rearranging and simplifying 
                      𝑟𝑢 >  1 + 𝑟  𝑥ℎℎ − 𝑥ℎ𝑙 1 + 𝑟     (20) 
And (20) is incompatible with segregation because it contradicts (18). This completes 
the proof of Proposition 2. 
What do we know about the relation between an integrated configuration and the 
possible existence of vacant lots? The truth is that we have not explored formally that 
issue yet. However, the coexistence of integrated neighborhoods and vacant lots looks 
plausible, since high levels of residential utility give rise (intuitively) to both phenomena 
at the same time; something that did not happen in the segregated case. 
We are about to show now the crucial result of the paper, related to the impact of 
different arrival rates / discount factors on the nature of the equilibrium. 
4. Influence of the Arrival Rate on the Nature of the Equilibrium 
Proposition 3: If the (necessary and sufficient) condition (𝑥ℎℎ + 𝑥𝑙) > 𝑥ℎ𝑙(2 − 𝑟
2) is 
satisfied, then the following couple of statements are true: 
- The slower the arrival rate (represented by a higher value of r) the more likely will 
be the equilibrium configuration to be integrated. 
- Identically, the faster is the arrival rate (represented by a lower value of r), the 
more likely will be the configuration to be segregated. 
Proof: Here we have to start from condition (12) and rewrite such inequality in this way: 
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1+𝑟
𝑟
 𝑥ℎℎ −  
1+ 1+𝑟 2
𝑟
 𝑥ℎ𝑙 +
𝑥𝑙
𝑟
> 𝑢   (21) 
Now, this inequality (21) that guarantees segregation should be easier to be fulfilled 
when the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to r is negative. In that case, a 
reduction in r (i.e. a faster arrival rate) would facilitate segregation. It is straightforward 
to check that the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to r is equal to 
−1
𝑟2
 𝑥ℎℎ + 𝑥𝑙 +  
2 − 𝑟2
𝑟2
 𝑥ℎ𝑙     22  
And then, our desired effect takes place if and only if 
𝑥ℎℎ + 𝑥𝑙 > 𝑥ℎ𝑙 2 − 𝑟
2  
This completes the proof of Proposition 3. 
Notice from (21) that the parameters facilitating a segregated configuration are those 
related to within-group externalities (xhh and xl), whereas strong between-group 
externalities (xhl) and a high residential utility (u) tend to promote integration. That is 
nothing new. Our point is emphasizing the role played by the arrival rate / discount 
factor to select the equilibrium configuration. It would be also very stimulating to 
introduce variations in residents’ (stochastic) income distribution (not just our 
predetermined sequencing) to study how the developers’ competition tends to 
generate more or less segregation as a response. 
5. Conclusions and Possible Extensions 
In this paper we have studied the conditions under which a low enough discount rate 
and / or a high arrival rate of new rich residents can result in higher levels of segregation 
in new neighborhoods. One natural extension seems to be exploring the constrained-
optimal allocation of residents by a monopolist that can not differentiate the product. 
Then, we could compare this constrained-efficient outcome with that resulting from our 
duopoly model, in order to obtain some normative implications: are the conditions for 
segregation more stringent under monopoly or under duopoly? Are poor people worse-
off under monopoly or under duopoly? And the rich people? 
We have clearly reached a bifurcation in which we have to decide how to pursue our 
future work in the issue. One possibility is forgetting about the implications about 
vacant lots and dynamic inefficiency, which is likely to arise under integrated (but never 
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under segregated) configurations. In that case, we could proceed by using a search 
model in which continuums of developers (each one being infinitely small) compete 
without strategic considerations. That framework is specially suited for the introduction 
of stochastic sequences of neighbors, and variations in their prior distribution of income 
should have a clear impact on segregation measures; at least as clear as it is now the 
influence of the discount factor. 
Another possibility is undertaking some empirical work, since the implications of our 
paper are clearly testable. We could measure the impact of urban demographic growth 
and variations in the interest rates as determinants of segregation levels. Another 
interesting sequel would be checking whether integrated neighborhoods are more likely 
to exhibit high proportions of vacant lots, unlike segregated ones. 
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7. Appendix 
Decision Tree 
                                                                             t=2 
 
                                                                                             Do not take l2 
                                     Take l2                                                                        Segregation 
                                                                                                          PD 
                 Integration                                       Wait                                        Do not wait 
 
 
t=3, 4                          PD takes h3, l4                                         RD takes h3             t=3 
             
             
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RD 
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